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Abstract
Many observers of contemporary China notice the revival of the so-called traditional
culture. This includes the public presence of rituals and artefacts that relate with tra-
ditional kinship, such as ancestral halls. This article explores a case in Shenzhen, the
Huang lineage and the larger surname group. A methodological issue looms large: What
exactly was the “tradition” that is perceived as reviving? The field of historical studies
on Chinese kinship is a highly contested domain, especially regarding the nature and
role of lineages. Therefore, we designed our article as a “conceptual case study”: we
reflect upon the state of our knowledge about Chinese kinship in the traditional sense,
develop a tentative conceptual framework, and apply this on our case. Central issues
include the relationship between descent as constructed and performed via kinship
rituals and patterns of cooperation among members of a lineage and the wider surname
group.
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Introduction
After China had embarked on market reforms in 1978, the country underwent a rapid
process of economic growth and social change. Given the radical critique of tradition by
the Communist Party between 1949 and 1978, most observers were slow in recognising
the fact that this has been accompanied by a revival of traditional forms of social life in
many facets. One particularly interesting phenomenon is the resurgence of kinship ritual,
which often goes hand in hand with the emergence of a distinct group of “villagers-in-
the-city” (Wang, 2015) as a result of the inclusion of rural into urban areas (Kipnis, 2017).
This phenomenon is salient in research on “urban villages” in the context of the
political economy of urban governance (Bach, 2017; Cheng, 2014; Chung and Unger,
2013; O’Donnell, 2017a; Tang, 2015). Research is rare that focuses on the phenomenon of
kinship and lineages in the first place and elucidates how exactly the revival unfolds
(Trémon, 2015a, 2015b). Although Chinese researchers noticed this early (Dai and Zhang,
2014), in-depth research in the context of urban villages is mostly lacking, with notable
exceptions such as Zhou (2014) who discusses the transition from lineage-based economic
organisation to modern corporate forms in Guangzhou. The phenomenon has attracted
attention by Japanese researchers, as reflected in the volume of collected papers edited by
Segawa and Kawagusa (2016). In his contribution on lineages in the Pearl River delta,
Kawagusa (2016) distinguishes between the period of “restoration” ( fukugen) between
1978 and 2000 and the period of “renaissance” ( fukkō) since 2000 in which lineages seem
to become an integral part of public life.
What is the precise reference of “tradition” when diagnosing its revival? Clearly,
much depends on how we conceptualise basic concepts such as “lineage” when inter-
preting information from the field. However, when we go back to the historical situation,
these concepts appear to be highly controversial in recent studies on social and economic
history. The historical record unearthed in recent meticulous studies of documents shows
that Chinese extended kinship organisation was highly flexible and adaptive to local
circumstances (Zheng, 2001). At the same time, we need to distinguish neatly between
social practices and beliefs in the population and the norms of extended kinship that
were endorsed and disseminated by the Confucian elites, even in the context of super-
ficially clear cases such as gender relations (Siu and Chan, 2010). Since the most
influential paradigm of Chinese lineages developed by Maurice Freedman was mainly
based on field evidence from Hong Kong New Territories, critics pointed out that the
colonial rulers in Hong Kong actively supported forms of “tradition” that partly matched
with the Confucian views, thus stabilising a specific form of lineage which was then
interpreted as reflecting the standard form (Chun, 2000; Cheung, 2016).
This diagnosis raises the question, what are the implications for evaluating the contem-
porary revival? Our article wants to tackle this question in applying a two-pronged strategy:
Firstly, we present a condensed critical account of the current status of conceptual
work and show directions towards a new scheme that can be applied on field data.
Secondly, we explore the validity and usefulness of this scheme in analysing one case
study. That means, this article is an empirically informed contribution to concept for-
mation and method in contemporary Chinese studies.
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Our case is taken from the megalopolis Shenzhen, arguably one of the most globa-
lised mainland Chinese cities. In the context of urban redevelopment, projects in tourism
and leisure often include the reconstruction of ancestral halls and temples and their
official recognition as “cultural heritage.” Today, this goes along with the active pro-
motion of traditional Chinese values by the Communist Party, such as elevating “filial
piety” (孝, xiao) to one of the pillars of Chinese society pursuing the “China dream.”
Contrary to the radical cultural critique of the past, today Confucianism is seen as a
national spiritual legacy that deserves not only respect but renewed promotion, both by
civil society actors and by government authorities (Billioud, 2007; Walton, 2018).
Against this background, the revival of lineages is a facet of emerging “cultural gov-
ernance” in China (Oakes, 2017; Perry, 2013).
We focus on the Huang (黄, Cantonese: Wong), who actively express their identity as
a descent group locally, nationally, and internationally. The surname Huang is one of the
most common surnames in China, about 27 million individuals with this name live in
Mainland China, and globally there are an estimated 60 million people with this name
(the numbers differ widely across various sources but are in these dimensions) (Baidu
baike, 2019a). However, we need to distinguish between the individuals associated with
the Huang surname and the local lineages in Shenzhen. The Huang are kinship groups
located in Shenzhen which relate with other groups with the same surname at many other
locations. Thus, they represent the ideal context to explore the meaning and function of
various concepts and ideas related to kinship in modern China and relate these to the
insights gained from new developments in social and economic history.
The case analysed in our article is embedded in long-term fieldwork in Shenzhen
launched in 2015, partly together with Feng Xingyuan (Academy of Social Sciences,
Beijing, Rural Development Institute); author Guo Man is a permanent resident of
Shenzhen and conducted regular activities of participant observation and interviewing,
intensified by periods of joint field activities with the second author Carsten Herrmann-
Pillath at least twice a year. The conceptual work grounds in a recent monograph by
Herrmann-Pillath (2017) elaborating on the relationship between ritual, culture, and
economy. The case of the Huang came to our attention when noticing the transregional
networks of Huang and the strong presence of Huang in the Internet (both WWW and
WeChat). That means, different from other cases, we can also rely on rich textual
materials to track the activities in the context of kinship. This is an advantage because, as
is well known from research on kinship groups in Hong Kong, members of lineages
often refrain from giving detailed information about their activities, so that information
in the Internet, voluntarily provided, is a good alternative.
Rethinking Chinese Extended Kinship
Our starting point is the English word ”clan,” which is often used in referring to the
global Huang at the international conventions of the “World Huang surname association”
(世界黄氏宗亲会, Shijie Huang shi zongqinhui). In the 1980s, the association emerged
out of increasing contacts among national Huang associations in Southeast Asia, Taiwan,
and the United States, formally established at a convention at Taipei in 1980 (Geren
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tushuguan, 2019a). It is physically manifest in global conventions: one of the biggest
took place in Shenzhen in 2002, when a traditional “common pot” feast was held on
Xiasha plaza on Yuanxiao eve, with 3,800 tables and 60,000 guests (mostly Huang)
attending, arguably the biggest event of that kind in history (Nandu wang, 2019).
In modern anthropological and sociological uses, the English “clan” corresponds to
the Chinese zongzu (宗族), which mostly refers to what anthropologists call the
“lineage.” The title of the international association combines this term with two others:
The term shi (氏, family name) is often used to denote a wider kinship group (氏族,
shizu), thus similar to “clan,” and the term qin (亲, kin) conveys the meaning of clo-
seness and emotions of belonging that are constitutive of kinship relations. In English,
the association also refers to the “Huang family.” Sometimes the terms are combined,
such as in a 2016 printed newsletter of the “World Huang General Chamber of Com-
merce”, which has Huang shi zongzu (黄氏宗族) in its headline. But obviously, this
does not imply that the surname association is a clan in the anthropological sense of the
term: for example, the acting president of the association, Huang Yingchao, is referred to
as a “head of clan” (宗长, zong zhang), but this refers to his role as the leader of the local
Huang at Xiasha village in Shenzhen, and in gatherings of Huang from different loca-
tions, the respective zong zhang lead the various groups (Geren tushuguan, 2019b;
Jiangxia Huang zu wang, 2019a). That means, the clan is a local structure, to be dis-
tinguished from the surname group with global reach.
There are two problems here, however, that we need to explore in more detail.
The first relates to the notion of descent. The Huang surname includes a subgroup
which is often represented as the core of Huang identity, the Jiangxia Huang with a
founding ancestor in Tang dynasty, Huang Qiaoshan. The larger group refers to the
Huang Kingdom in the Warring States period. The ancestral hall of the local clan at
Xiasha has a mural showing the local descent line starting with a more recent descendant
of Huang Qiaoshan. Therefore, the question is where the actual boundaries of the clan
are located, since the descent line is an open construct in terms of chronological depth
(on the role of founding ancestors, cf. Cohen, 2017; Trémon, 2014).
The second is the relationship between the clan as ritual entity and the local kinship
group. This transpires in the complex uses of the term “lineage” in Chinese studies and
its reference to Chinese terms. According to several authoritative sources, the correct
Chinese correspondence to “lineage” would be jiazu (家族) (Cohen, 1990; Fei, 1947;
Gui, 2014), but this is used rarely in places such as Shenzhen when referring to the
revival of kinship ritual. Indeed, local people tend to use the term zongzu when referring
to the ritual activities, but mostly simply speak of their village or often denote them-
selves as descendants of a specific ancestor.
“Clan” and “lineage” are clearly distinguished by sinologists and historical anthro-
pologists (e.g. Baker, 1979), but often mixed up by sociologists and economists. One of
the standard distinctions is to refer to the clan as an alliance between lineages with the
same surname or as an artificial descent group of considerable size, mostly in an urban
context (Baker, 1977). However, this definition blurs the distinction between “higher-
order lineages” and clans, since the former also refers to alliances between branches of
lineages that trace themselves back to the same ancestor.
Guo and Herrmann-Pillath 53
In terms of the history of the disciplines, the notion of “lineage” was given an
authoritative conceptual frame by Maurice Freedman (1967), based on research in
Southeast Asia, South China, and, specifically, the lineages in the New Territories of
Hong Kong. This approach defined the lineage as a corporate body that owns land
collectively and acts as a corporate landlord, performs collective rituals of ancestor
worship, and relates ritually to the Chinese state as a central element of village self-
organisation according to clan rules. The subsequent discussion and research have
shown that this view may seriously bias our view on Chinese kinship ritual and practice
(Cohen, 1990; Chun, 2000; Stafford, 2000).
Fei Xiaotong (1947), in suggesting jiazu (in English translations, translated back as
“patrilineage”), already had criticised Western approaches to Chinese extended kinship
(he received his PhD at London) (Harrell, 2011). In his view, the jiazu is a flexible
structure with many possible circles of expansion, reaching from the nuclear family to
what we designate as “lineage” (for a related focus on jia including lineages, see Gates,
1996: 95ff.). It also has a ritual dimension, in terms of religious practices within the
family dwelling (such as an altar) and ancestor worship, such as “sweeping the graves.”
Whereas the zongzu is a landowning corporate body as defined by Freedman, the jiazu is
an economic organisation in many shapes and with many functions, as epitomised in the
Chinese form of “family business” (家族企业, jiazu qiye). This implies flexibility in
living the boundaries of the jiazu: most importantly, a concrete jiazu may include affinal
kin (in family business, e.g., the daughter’s husband may be involved in a prominent
position). These affinal relations are mostly created by the “kin work” of women (Chan
WH, 2010).
Following Chun (2000), a very complicated issue is the relationship between lineage
and kinship in general. This relates to three distinct fundamental terms in Chinese, zong
(宗, ancestor), jia (家, family), and qin (亲, kin), which combine with other characters,
especially zu (族, descent), in forming more specific terms (on historical etymology, see
Ebrey and Watson, 1986). One way to distinguish between the jiazu and zongzu is to
refer to zongzu as the descent line in terms of ritual, that is, the continuation of ancestral
worship across the generations. This does not automatically imply genealogical relat-
edness in terms of consanguinity: it is not biological descent that creates ritual, but ritual
that performs descent culturally. Accordingly, the “ancestor” can be an historically
distant person, making factual consanguinity elusive; or families may adopt male suc-
cessors who fulfil the ritual duties, and so on.
In comparison, the jiazu may not necessarily translate into ritualistic eminence in
terms of zongzu, which also involves a different role of public rituals, especially
regarding the public display of genealogies in ancestral halls versus keeping them at
home (Cohen, 1990). The jia as such is a unit that is established by marriage, thus is
rooted in a social act that explicitly avoids consanguinity because of exogamy rules.
Hence, we need heed attention to qin here which refers to closeness of feelings and
social interactions and, therefore, may include both agnatic and affinal kin and is
independent from consanguinity. We might refer the term jiazu to “conviviality,” living
together, with shared experiences, shared economic activities and assets, and so on. That
means, in more abstract terms, in analysing lineages we must distinguish between a
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vertical and a horizontal dimension, with the former connecting to the notion of ritual
descent, and the latter connecting to families and kin in shared life worlds, such as the
village community (this follows Gui, 2014). Strict patrilineality is the reflection of the
centuries-long imposition of Neoconfucian orthodoxy on Chinese society but does not
necessarily reflect social practices. The pre-eminence of zongzu in South China was the
result of a deliberate promulgation of Neoconfucian ideas via many channels (Ebrey,
1985; Faure, 2007).
The term jiazu or generally zu is also used in the most comprehensive reassessment of
historical kinship organisation by Zheng Zhenman (2001) (in the translation, the English
title has “Family Lineage Organization” which renders the Chinese “jiazu zuzhi”家族组
织). Like Fei Xiaotong, the jia refers to the family as a social unit that can be extended in
many ways, with the lineage zu as the primordial form. However, when referring to
different types of lineages, Zheng adds the term zong, resulting in the English translation
of zongzu into “lineage,” but not “clan.”
Zheng argues that the lineage is a flexible organisational form centred on the notion
of descent which is determined by the developmental cycles of the family under
changing and varying local conditions. Family division is a central phenomenon, which
would almost necessarily imply a decline of social status and wealth of single families,
thus producing strong incentives to create institutional forms by which the family as a
group of shared descent can maintain cooperation undergirded by shared assets: This
results in what Zheng calls an “inheritance lineage.” The inheritance lineage typically
emerges from large families which want to maintain their social position. A central
motive is the parallel transfer of certain assets and ritual obligations of ancestor worship
to the next generation: Therefore, zong comes into play here, and not just jia. Once this
primordial form of lineage is established, other organisational forms become possible.
One is the “control-subordination lineage,” based on territorial ties; the other is the
“contractual lineage,” based on common interests.
The control-subordination lineage is ideal-typically represented by single-lineage
villages or villages with dominant lineages where the lineage is also a form of
grassroots-level political organisation by local elites. One important aspect is the thin-
ning out of consanguineal relations among the members of the group which only share a
distant ancestor. This is reflected in the internal branching of the lineage, resulting in
internal stratification of branches, with one branch assuming the elite and leadership role.
In comparison, the contractual lineage is the most flexible form that activates kinship to
form a wide range of functional organisations devoted to specific goals, in Qing dynasty
increasingly business activities. The central institutional feature is the “share” (股份,
gufen): in contractual lineages, the rights of members are embodied in the shares that
define shared ownership in the assets of the lineage and give the right to monitor and
even have voice in the organisational decision-making, for instance, in lineage meetings
(shareholder assemblies).
The common feature of these different forms of lineage is ritual related to descent. On
the one hand, maintaining proper forms of ancestral ritual signalling relative social status
is a major function of more complex lineage organisation, but at the same time, this is
also a medium by which new forms of organisation can be created, including business
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enterprises (Faure, 1996, 2006; Zelin, 2009). This leads us to consider the role of kinship
relative to other social relations. We can put Zheng’s contractual lineages in the context
of the extremely rich Chinese associational life (mostly designated 会, hui), such as
native place associations (Sangren, 1984). This is where we can place the phenomenon
of surname associations which mostly use the term shi (氏, family name). This term
complicates our discussion further, since shi on the one hand relates to “surname” (姓, xing),
but in the composite shizu (氏族) would also refer to “clan” in the sense of the descent
group (Fei, 1947, uses the term in this way; Faure, 2007, distinguishes between surname
groups and lineages).
Contractual lineages share with associations basic organisational features, such as
rotating leadership and open membership. In traditional villages, the various forms of
lineage have always coexisted. For example, an inheritance lineage might create asso-
ciations for specific purposes that include only some of its members. These associations
may take the form of a lineage but can also be of a more general associational form
(Cohen, 1990).
Hence, it appears that the defining difference between lineages and other associational
forms is “descent” as zu (氏族). What does “descent” eventually mean? The context in
which groups related via descent define their shared identity is migration. Imperial China
was a society shaped by migration, from North to South, from coastal areas to interior
territories, with different spatial reach and scope. Typically, genealogies refer to original
settlers, and larger groups are defined via chain migration to some place of secondary
origin. This is where surname and lineage relate to each other: in most cases, descent as a
genealogical notion is at the same time reflecting a history of migration. Ultimately, all
people with the same surname may go back to some ancestor in the remote past, and
later generations migrated to many different places, where they established their local
lineages. As a result, the borderlines between the different concepts are blurred. Emi-
grants typically maintain their ties with their native villages and may even, at least in
first-generation migrants, maintain the idea of returning home (creating the social type of
the perennial sojourner) (Watson, 2004). In this setting, native place becomes dominant
over consanguinity in defining kinship. This explains why the intensive and continuing
activities of Chinese emigrant families in “searching their roots” (寻根, xun gen) include
the reconstruction of ancestral halls (Kuah-Pearce, 2011).
Let us summarise our complex discussion of Chinese kinship. It emerges that on a
more abstract conceptual level, we need to distinguish neatly between consanguinity,
conviviality, descent, and ritual as a performative means to define and manifest descent.
Whereas in ritual terms descent is clearly defined as patrilineal, conviviality widely
opens the reference of kinship relations, especially in terms of territory, that is, the
village, and regarding affinal relatives. The territorial aspect stands at the centre of
Zheng’s notion of “control-subordination lineage,” the affinal aspect looms large in the
formation of alliances between lineages that are ritually defined as patrilineal. In com-
parison, descent is a much broader category, because it can be almost arbitrarily
extended via expanding the genealogical depth, if only artificially. Yet, via ritual even
most elusive forms of descent can be performed in creating organisations that follow the
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pattern of a contractual lineage. One powerful motive always was shared economic
interests. The case of the Huang allows for further detailing this conceptual framework.
The Huang at Shenzhen: The Complex Interaction between
Lineage, Descent, and Surname
According to common accounts of descent, the Huang in Shenzhen trace themselves
back to the famous official and scholar Huang Qiaoshan (黄峭山, 872–953) who is
himself identified as direct 128th-generation descendant of the Yellow Emperor Huang
Di. Today, almost three million Huang in Guangdong province might claim direct
descendance to him (Baidu baike, 2019b). In the turbulent times of the collapse of the
Tang dynasty, Huang Qiaoshan moved to Fujian. He selected three of his twenty-one
sons to be his formal descendants, thereby establishing three branches. Later, in another
turbulent time, when the Song Empire moved southward under the pressure of the
Mongols, some of his descendants settled in today’s Shenzhen territory.
In modern Shenzhen, these genealogical roots are shared by various groups with the
surname Huang. Basically, these divide into three, which is, however, not exhaustive, but
represents the most salient pattern: the “guangfu” Huang, that is, the Shenzhen natives
who speak a dialect of Cantonese and whose territory concentrates in the original Special
Economic Zone (SEZ), the Hakka Huang at Longgang district, and the Chaoshan Huang
who mostly immigrated to Shenzhen after 1978. Our focal case is taken from the first
group.
The two “guangfu” Huang villages in Shenzhen, Xiasha and Shangsha, trace them-
selves back to a 15th-generation descendant of Huang Qiaoshan, Huang Moutang, born
in 1183, and who is physically palpable in the artefact of his grave and a pagoda which is
also a Buddhist temple and which was designated cultural heritage of Guangdong
Province in 2002 (for pictures of the tomb, see Hu 2013). He is the ancestor of the
Xiasha Huang, but also of other branches at other places, so that the Xiasha ancestral hall
is devoted to Huang Siming, a ninth-generation descendant as immediate ancestor of the
Xiasha Huang (Geren tushuguan, 2019c). In comparison, the Hakka Huang at Kengzi
village, Longgang, refer to Huang Chaoxuan who lived during the transition from Ming
to Qing, with a diffuse reference back to a Song dynasty official named Huang Liao who
is in turn identified as another ninth-generation descendant of Huang Qiaoshan (Liu,
2001: 56 f.).
Migration history and genealogy identify the boundaries between various Huang
groups and genealogical branches and establish different degrees of relatedness. Ritual
activities perform the genealogical distinctions, resulting in lived distinctions between
groups demarcated via surname, lineage, or branches of lineages. In addition, there are also
linguistic markers of genealogical boundaries (Cohen, 1996 [1960]). Whereas the first
wave of immigrants in Song dynasty merged linguistically with what emerged as local
Cantonese, the wave triggered by the Ming-Qing transition and later by the reopening of
coastal areas for settlement retained the Hakka dialect. Until most recently the further
division of surname groups into lineages was also reflected in lineage-specific dialects (the
so-called clan language 祖宗话, zuzonghua), which relates to different cohorts of
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migrants: for example, the Hakka Huang at Kengzi divide into two clans in different
settlements, distinguished by different times of arrival in the area (Liu, 2001: 230ff.).
In a similar vein, the Huang at Shangxia and Xiasha represent different branches at
the lowest level of partitioning: The Shangxia Huang are currently renovating their
Ancestral Hall, devoted to Huang Moutang, on a “Cultural Square” according to the
Xiasha model. The hall and the associated Tianhou temple can be traced back to Ming
times, but have been reconstructed many times. At the border between the two com-
munities, a large stone bears an inscription celebrating their perennial cooperation. Both
relate to Huang Moutang, but the Xiasha hall is devoted to one of his descendants. These
ritual distinctions mirror substantial differences in the development of the two villages.
Both Shangsha and Xiasha had strong leaders who set up development corporations
in the 1980s. The background of this was the fuzziness of the land property rights
system: according to Chinese law, rural land is owned by the collectives, which, how-
ever, may represent different administrative structures in practice (Ho, 2001, 2013). In
the Pearl River Delta, these often turned out to be the original single-lineage villages. Via
the establishment of corporations, the assets were shifted out of the administrative
structure, which was crucial when Shenzhen abolished the rural status of the urbanising
areas, normally implying that the land was transformed into state-owned land (Po, 2008;
Trappel, 2011). However, land use rights could be kept under the control of the cor-
porations. As has been well documented, the outcome differs widely even in the Pearl
River Delta (Wong, 2015). Often, the villagers were bought out by the municipal
government to make the land accessible to urban development, with developers in
charge. But there are important cases where the villages retained control, as in our cases.
When the legal form became available in the early 1990s, the development corpo-
rations obtained the structure of “shareholding cooperatives” (股份合作公司, gufen
hezuo gongsi). The villagers are individual shareholders, but their right to sell the shares
is restricted, so that the collective status is preserved. The companies are led by elite
members of the lineage, with formal positions as village heads or party secretaries. We
mentioned Huang Yingchao, the lineage head of Xiasha Huang and former village head:
He has been Chairman of the Xiasha cooperative shareholding company for more than
twenty years, is not a member of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Vice Chairman
of the Standing Committee of Futian People’s Congress.
The two villages underwent rapid economic development, yet with distinct patterns.
Shangsha early established an industrial park which later was transformed into a high-
tech science park. Xiasha, bordering Hong Kong, became notorious for its red-light
zones and as “second wife town” for Hong Kong Chinese. It shed this past off
through a comprehensive process of urban renewal led by Huang Yingchao, resulting in
its current status as a leisure location in Shenzhen. This redevelopment included the
construction of a new ritual infrastructure, a lavish ancestral hall and a Houwang temple
located on a large public square dotted with instalments of religious and mythical
references from all over the world (for pictures, see O’Donnell, 2017b, 2018).
The shareholding cooperatives are directly responsible for planning, funding, and
implementing these ritual activities and architectures. In fact, they bear much resem-
blance with traditional lineage corporations, to the extent that one can say that the
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corporation is congruous with the lineage (compare Trémon 2015a; Zhou, 2014). In the
context of single-lineage villages, this also means that village administration is partly
merged with the business structure. This is not just reflecting lineage collective agency
but is a direct outcome of administrative practices, as Po (2012) analyses in much detail:
the municipal government operates under tight fiscal constraints and therefore co-opts or
just shifts many tasks of grassroots-level administration, public services, and infra-
structure investment to the former villages, now incorporated as business entities.
This high degree of institutional ambiguity of the cooperatives roots in the socialist
transformation after 1949: shareholding cooperatives are institutional successors to the
rural collectives. This is reflected in the Xiasha museum, which displays all production
team leaders of the Maoist era as the predecessors of today’s leadership. As has been
noticed by fieldworkers early after 1978 (Potter and Potter, 1990: 261ff., 334), the
socialist collectives in fact were very similar to lineage corporations, with the only
difference that the traditional relationship between elites and common members was
overturned. That means, the language of socialist property can be also read in terms
of traditional meanings, such as in the context of property rights, which traditionally
also distinguished between formal ownership and possession of use rights (soil and
subsoil rights).
Today, the institutional hybridity of shareholding cooperatives is directly reflected in
the governance structure and the distribution of shares. The shares of Xiasha cooperative
divide into two types, one is the “collective shares” (50.99 per cent) and the other is the
“cooperative shares” (49.01 per cent). The collective shares have accumulated via
retained profits in the past. In the governance structure, there is a “collective assets
management committee” that supervises these assets. This committee has voting rights
in the General Assembly of shareholder and is chaired by the Party secretary (who is a
relative of Huang Yingchao). Clearly, although the cooperatives are independent busi-
ness entities, by means of this construct, there is a direct line of intervention via the
parallel structures of government and party by which, for example, urban infrastructure
projects can be negotiated (as described in Po, 2012). However, the CCP representatives
are also members of the local clan.
The cooperative shares partly retain features of shares in traditional lineage corpo-
rations, since certain lineage rules apply, staying in tension with Chinese law, such as
limiting inheritance to the patrilineal line, as demarcated by the inclusion in the gen-
ealogy (家谱, jiapu). The Xiasha Corporation keeps the number of shares constant,
originally allocated to the community per household, represented by the male head. As a
result, in-marrying women do not own shares, and sons inherit the shares, but the
number of shares is not increased (which effectively results in joint ownership of shares
if there is more than one son, dividing the dividends among them). Daughters do not
inherit shares, but receive a compensation, mainly via the dowry, as they are not included
in the jiapu. Huang women own shares, but they cannot take shares with them when
marrying. Hence, the patriarchal household remains the central unit, which is institu-
tionally supported by the fact that ownership of shares is tied to the registration hukou.
As in the case described by Kipnis (2017) in Shandong, traditional patriarchal rules are
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adapted to the modern legal system but are not superseded (he speaks of “viricentricity”
to catch this hybridisation).
The ritual dimension of the Shareholding cooperative is manifest in various activities
that are funded by the company. Central events are rites held at Qingming and Chon-
gyang holidays, with the former being simpler, held only at the Xiasha ancestral hall, and
the latter also including the Huang Moutang tomb. These rites follow the full traditional
prescriptions, again salient in the fact that women are not allowed to take part in the
rituals that are performed inside the Ancestral Hall. They are always followed by a
traditional pencai (盆菜) feast (mostly translated as “common pot” or “big basin”).
The common pot was also noticed as a peculiar ritual activity in the New Territories
by James Watson (1987, 2014; cf. Chan SC, 2010; for more detail, see Guo and
Herrmann-Pillath, 2019). It is a mix of many valuable food items, and the pot is shared
by all individuals attending the meal, eating directly from the pot, which is obviously
differing from standard practices in China. Traditionally, common pot feasting was an
important lineage ritual at certain events, such as New Year or the birth of a son, and it
contained a substantial amount of fat pork. For many poor lineage members, sharing a
common pot was the rare occasion to eat pork. “Pork” had also the meaning of dis-
tributing the income from lineage assets equally, via the free provision of pork bought by
the profits, “dividing the pork” among the lineage members. Hence, the common pot is a
ritual that embodies values of village solidarity: Everybody eats from the same pot, and
nobody needs to watch whether she or he may take away something from others.
The Huang modified the common pot, which is signalled by a variant of the name, the
“big common pot” (大盆菜, da pencai) (Di yi xing zuo wang, 2017; Shenzhen shangbao,
2016). It is also served at the World Conventions of Huang, thus celebrating the global
community. It has been even registered as a regional cultural heritage item and as a
trademark. In the local Xiasha museum, a large space is devoted to pencai, with two life-
sized bronze statue arrangements showing locals feasting at two tables. Noteworthy, the
Shenzhen flagship museum, the Shenzhen bowuguan, replicates this installation and has
a video installation with a lengthy presentation of the Huang ancestral rites.
As a local leader, Huang Yingchao embodies the hybridity of the cooperative which
also creates tensions. In 2016, members of the local lineage used the site of the ancestral
hall to stage a protest, complaining that dividends are too small, and profits are mis-
appropriated through obscure channels (Beiliu shenghuo, 2017). Huang villagers receive
a fixed rent from their shares of CNY 10,000 annually: most of the retained profits are
controlled via the “Management committee.” Lineage members chose the ritual stage to
express their complaints, thus invoking the moral economy of the lineage as performed,
for example, in the pencai feast. Meanwhile, the case has been withdrawn. This shows
that processes of stratification have unfolded, gradually reproducing traditional patterns
of elite formation within lineages.
The Shareholding cooperative stands at the centre of a network of Huang business. As
in most urban villages (Chung and Unger, 2013), the villagers own their own apartment
blocks which go back to the first stage of development of urban villages where villagers
used their plots for private homes to construct buildings with more storeys to accom-
modate migrant workers. The renewal of this settlement requires coordination via the
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cooperative. After renewal, the new apartments can generate rental income of CNY
20,000–30,000 per month and household. The company is also the coordinator of other
investments in the area, such as hotels, restaurants, and other facilities, which are mostly
owned by Huang (though often rented out to non-Huang entrepreneurs). The cooperative
coordinates a Huang business network that reaches far beyond the urban village. It has
set up many subsidiaries, mostly 100 per cent owned, led by Huang directors and
operating in other domains and areas of business (the information on these networks can
be retrieved from a proprietary database accessible against a fee, https://www.tianyan-
cha.com/). These Huang directors in turn own or lead other business entities, which
involve other investors, often from the respective kinship networks. One medium by
which such joint investments can be coordinated is the surname transcending the
boundaries of the Xiasha lineage.
When investigating into Huang business networks, it is essential to distinguish
between surname group and lineages. The Xiasha Huang compare with other Huang in
being very actively involved in urban development. There is the interesting case of
Lvjing Holding Ltd, one of the biggest developers in China, listed in Hong Kong, which
cooperates with Shangsha village. The founder was a Huang from Maoming who
migrated to Shenzhen. Recently, he donated substantial money to rebuild the 700-year-
old Huang ancestral temple at Yangmei town, Guandi village (Wo de Maoming, 2011).
Business people with surname Huang are major figures in Shenzhen real estate business.
According to a 2016 newspaper report, various Huang serve as chairpersons of at least
19 real estate companies in Shenzhen (Shenzhen fangchanye xinxi wang, 2016). How-
ever, many of those Huang emigrated from Chaoshan region to Shenzhen as construction
workers when the SEZ was launched, and few of them are direct relatives.
An intriguing observation is that competition among lineages drives the real estate
business in Shenzhen via building urban attractions, such as big shopping malls or
convention halls, in the context of redeveloping urban villages: Xiasha has KK Mall
with Jingji group, Shangsha has Lvjing Mall with Hong Kong Lvjing group (as men-
tioned, chaired by a Huang), Gangxia (Wen clan) has Hilton Mall with Dazhonghua
group (this is also chaired by a Huang) and so on. In other words, we observe a form of
territorial competition between lineages over control of land and valuable real estate,
which involves relative status in Shenzhen society, being signalled by prestige real estate
projects. Ritual activities also signal status, such as the pencai events which often boast
their size and number of guests: this aspect has also become prominent in Hong Kong,
where pencai often have assumed the role of a political statement in the context of Hong
Kong politics, with the Heung Yee Kuk as a major protagonist (Chan SC, 2010).
Transregional and Transnational Networking: From
Surname to Descent, and Back
As we have seen, the Xiasha Huang in Shenzhen have evolved from a rural to an urban
lineage, closely interacting with global Huang, and mediated via Huang branches at
other locations: for example, the General Secretary of the World Huang General
Chamber of Commerce is located at Xiamen, where a large ritual hall is devoted to
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Jiangxia culture, and the local branch only evokes a short history going back to the turn
of the nineteenth to twentieth century, with Huang Peisong as the founding personality, a
military leader in early Republican China. Via Xiamen, close connections to Taiwan and
Overseas Huang are ritually mobilised (Sina, 2011).
Fujian was an important destination of the early Huang migrations, resulting in a
strong concentration of Huang in this region. In the context of the current analysis of
business networking, it is highly significant that Zheng (2001: 237f., 317f.) identifies the
Huang as a group that stood out as a “dispersed lineage” in Qing times. That means, the
Huang were very active in creating lineage organisations that were not based on con-
sanguinity and therefore would figure as “inheritance lineages” but as ritual communities
that were open to all Huang who had migrated to Fujian. Various local lineages might
just donate to be included in a central Huang ancestral hall in Xianxi. Accordingly, this
pattern could also be extended into business activities: Zheng has the example of a “Hall
of Public Accumulation” established by various Huang lineages in Minxian that operated
as a business entity into the Republican era. As we see, there has always been a strong
dynamic between lineage organisation and all kinds of ritual mobilisation that relate to
the surname Huang and invoke shared descent beyond more direct genealogical relations
(for similar cases, see Glahn, 2016: 336ff.). This dynamic is partly institutionally driven
by the surname associations.
The modern international movement of surname associations was gaining speed in
Taiwan in the 1980s, building on the presence of local associations worldwide, but
especially in Southeast Asia (Baidu baike, 2019c). The function of these associations is
mainly to organise ritual activities, such as establishing ancestral halls and genealogical
research, but also philanthropic activities and maintaining closer interaction among
members, especially business-related, and even conflict resolution. There are local
surname associations in many countries that provide the ground on which the world
association is built. For example, in Singapore, there are more than 200 surname
associations which have been strongly supported by the government as a counterweight
to native place and dialect identity politics (Chan, 2002). Almost everywhere, a central
ritual artefact is an ancestral hall.
Now, obviously the World Huang association does not automatically include all
global Huang but include only those who actively recognise both notions of zong and
qin in their social life. What does that mean? Most importantly, it means that these are
individuals who are aware of and appreciate their roots and actively “search” for them.
Specifically, this refers to connecting their current status, for example, as an US
American national in the third migrant generation, with the native place of the original
migration event, and to get involved in certain ritual practices, such as visiting ancestral
halls and contributing to genealogies (for a Canadian example, see Wong, 2017). In the
case of the Huang, one core historical reference is to Jiangxia (江夏) as one of the first
destinations of migration of the early Huang tribes, which is today a suburban district of
Wuhan, Hubei Province. During Warring States period, the Huang originally had an
independent kingdom in the territory of modern Inner Mongolia, but after destruction
fled to Hubei (the history of Huang migration is overviewed on Jiangxia Huang zu
wang, 2019b). In Hubei province, there are many counties and cities that contain the
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name Huang, which goes back to these migration events (such as Huangmei or
Huanggang). There are 12 original branches and locations (郡望, junwang) of Huang
going back to the early Empire (Jiangxia Huang zu wang, 2019c). Therefore, the term
Jiangxia is often used as a synonym for the Huang. Many types of associations connect
to Jiangxia, apart from Jiangxia Huang associations also Jiangxia culture study groups
and similar kinds. One of the richest websites about Huang is named “Jiangxia Huangzu
wang” (http://www.jxhzw.org/, accessed 6 March 2019). Another website (http://www.
ihuang.org/a8-01.htm, accessed 6 March 2019) gives a list of Huang associations
worldwide, which probably is incomplete, but reveals an interesting pattern, as there are
almost no associations in the northern and western provinces of China.
Websites and WeChat sites devoted to surname and ancestral activities proliferate
in China. If we look at the main page of the Huangshi zong qin wang in the World
Wide Web, apart from offering general information about Huang and related activi-
ties, it is a pool of regional and local websites devoted to the Huang. The site is
managed by a group of Huang from all over China, with a concise organisational
structure and a detailed division of labour, including legal aspects, cultural history,
and business (this information is publicised: http://www.ihuang.org/b2-01-0001.htm,
accessed 19 January 2019).
One can speak of a “competition for attention” among websites with often similar
content, but different design and audiences. Many sites have become obviously defunct
and incomplete: one factor is that communication moved to WeChat. Another factor is
that the organisers of websites may learn about different needs and audiences. Websites
may seem inactive in Chinese, but are active in English, with many news about Huang
activities overseas, such as in Malaysia. Most sites share a similar structure. They
normally include
 an introduction to the respective local Huang Surname Association and its charter,
 a calendar of events,
 an introduction of various ancestral halls, their locations and related information,
 information about the genealogy,
 a list of famous Huang and their lives,
 a news page,
 a list of companies led by Huang,
 and other items (such as books on Huang) and
 if existing, information about specific activities or institutions connected to the
surname association.
The status of various Huang websites varies widely, with different geographical
scope, from provinces to counties or even urban districts. For example, the Jiangxi
website apparently was launched with great vigour, but faded out in 2015 (http://
www.jxhs.org.cn/, 19 accessed May 2018). But take the active website of the Hainan
Jiangxia culture association, the Hainan Jiangxia wenhua wang see above. At the time
of our first access (http://www.hnjxyjh.com/index.asp, accessed 19 May 2018), on the
front page, the recent celebration of ancestral rites devoted to the ancestor Huang Chi are
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documented who is the ancestor of an estimated 300,000 Huang (the site is still active,
accessed 21 January 2019). Another website of the Hainan Huang surname association,
the Hainan Huang shi wang (see above), continuously reports about local ancestral rites
(Hainan Huang shi wang, 2019). The website of the Guangxi Huang community (http://
www.gxhszqh.com) has been very active, too, and features recent news such as about the
visit of the former Chairman of the global Huang surname association, Huang Muhe, at
Guangxi, holding ancestral rites, or the visit of a Huang delegation from Jiangxi. This
kind of news makes an important pattern visible: the Internet reflects underlying net-
working activities in the “real world,” such as mutual visits and meetings. It is important
noticing that there is an overlap with tourism, but often there is a clear ritualistic
component. Yet, this does not imply that the halls relate to a genuine genealogical
relationship between the visitors and the local Huang.
As we mentioned, an important trend is the shift to WeChat where users can register
for a public address (公众号, gong zhong hao, easily searchable via typing “黄氏” into
WeChat search engine). This makes referencing complicated, because the WeChat
content is even less stable than the www content. The WeChat sites feed their users with
regular information on Huang-related ritual events, such as the Jiangxia Huang shi jiazu
wang (江夏黄氏家族网), which also has a website (https://688522.kuaizhan.com/,
accessed 7 March 2019). Another major WeChat site is the Quanqiu Huang shi yi jiaqin
(全球黄氏一家亲) (for an introduction, see Baidu baike, 2019d). This has various
rubrics, including a “Huang shopping city” and information about ritual activities. Other
services include a site where users can post messages on “searching the root” (寻根,
xungen) activities. The Huang Shopping City (黄氏商城, Huang shi shangcheng) is an
electronic shop where Huang can buy and sell products. The shop is handled by a
Shenzhen registered company, the Shenzhen Huang Surname Culture Web Technology
Company Ltd (深圳市黄氏文化网络技术有限公司; for a report, see Rong hui dao,
2017, accessed 21 January 2019). The company is not mainly working for profit, its
premises have been donated by a Huang leader, and about twenty Huang work without
formal salary. This apparent nature of a “social enterprise” is also reflected in the
description of the Huang internet shop as “shared benefit economy” (分享经济, fenxiang
jingji) and “common benefit management” (共享管理, gongxiang guanli), which means,
for example, that there are no fees for selling and buying via the site. According to the
company, the Huang site offers many advantages over ordinary shops.
The Huang Chamber of Commerce (黄氏商会, Huang shi shanghui) addresses
Huang companies and offers many services such as business communication and sup-
porting the recruitment of personnel. Again, it puts strong emphasis on moral integrity
and transparency in its operations, with the motto of “mutual help and shared benefit,
jointly creating value” (互助同享，共创价值, huzhu tongxiang, gongchuang jiazhi).
Members can post information about their companies on the site. For example, one
specific aim is to develop reliable supplier relations among Huang companies. As in the
case of the websites, WeChat shows some competition between various Huang service
providers. An example is the Huang shi zong qin hui (黄氏宗亲惠), which combines
an internet shop with services related to ritual activities, such as information about
ancestral halls.
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How is the shared identity of Huang established? A central notion is “Jiangxia cul-
ture,” hence directly related to myths of origin. This ties back to the notion of “family
customs” (家风, jiafeng) that are codified in texts, poems, and hymns (for an illumi-
nating historical account, see Sichuan sheng Jiangxia wenhua yanjiuhui, 2015; the
Jiangxia Huang zu wang (2019d) has a separate section for this; the WeChat sites
similarly have special sections for jiafeng or jiaxun). For example, the local Huang in
Shenzhen always recite a poem at festive occasions that is attributed to Huang Qiaoshan,
while at the same time this reference establishes a connection to the Huang worldwide
who relate themselves to “Jiangxia culture.” The previously mentioned ancestral hall at
Xiamen connected to the World Chamber of Commerce has a special showroom where
visitors learn not only about the jiafeng of Huang but can also search via a computer for
jiafeng of many other Chinese surname groups. This emphasis on traditional moral
conceptions of kinship is also manifest in public events, such as celebrating Huang
ancestors as moral exemplars (Bao’an government, 2018).
The latter observation reveals that the myths of origin also highlight the direct con-
nection between lineage, surname, and identity as Chinese (Kawagusa, 2016). The Huang
communicate a notion of cultural identity that is deeply embedded in Chinese identity in
terms of shared culture, beyond subethnic and even ethnic divisions. That means, being a
Huang means belonging to a cultural line of descent of the largest scope, even with
mythical origins. Cultural descent finds its concrete expression in genealogies, which
interlock and are nested, ultimately leading back to the “Yellow emperor.” Naturally, the
Huang are very active in the official “Grand Rites” offered to the Yellow Emperor
(Jiangxia Huang shi jiazu wang, 2019). Another fascinating example are the 2017 national
rites devoted to the mythical emperor Shundi, where delegations of various surname
groups attended, including a large Huang delegation (Jiangxia Huang zu wang, 2019e).
The cult of Shundi is new in contemporary China and is supported by the government,
while also serving business interests in tourism (see in detail McNeal, 2011).
This bridge between rituals of descent and cultural identity can be also diagnosed on
the local level: The Huang at Xiasha strongly emphasise their roots in Han culture: for
example, at the entrance gate to Xiasha plaza is a huge statue depicting the first local
Huang “jinshi” graduate in Imperial China. This is essential to claiming their status as an
elite lineage in the context of Shenzhen metropolis. Many of the local lineages can trace
themselves back to migration events in Song dynasty, where often members of the
Confucian elites were leaders. In invoking those “high ancestors,” they can signal social
status based on cultural excellence in the past (Cohen, 2017). This strategy of translating
cultural capital into social capital is also very pronounced in the case of Hakka who tend
to represent exemplars of Confucian morality and family norms, for example, in
downplaying many rituals of popular religion (e.g. practiced by Chaoshan people) and
putting strong emphasis on ancestral cult. Another telling example is reported by Ina-
zawa (2016): in the Cantonese city of Shanwei, the local Huang surname association is
very active in the context of a strong presence of “fisher people” (蛋, dan, “Tanka”
living on boats) who conventionally are seen as a subethnic group, even with Mongol
origin, but who have introduced various activities in establishing ancestral halls and
genealogies most recently, thus demonstrating Han origin.
Guo and Herrmann-Pillath 65
To sum up this section, surname groups with global reach perform their identity in
close connection with myths of shared cultural descent, interlocking with local rituals on
ancestral worship that result in the construction of nested descent, directly connecting the
local and the global. Let us now turn to assessing the Huang case in terms of the
conceptual framework of the second section.
Analytical Resume´ and Conclusion
In reflecting our case of Huang, it is stimulating to go back to earlier contributions. In
her study of a Hong Kong lineage with now global reach, Chan (2001) argues that the
lineage has become “de-territorialised” as an “imagined community.” Even though, as
Watson (2004) muses, eventually land rights appear to be an anchor that grounds lineage
identity in claims on economic assets, for many modern lineages, these are much less
important than other benefits that can be gained from cooperation within the lineage,
such as business opportunities. Chan’s term “imagined community” points to the fact
that kinship ritual has a performative function: it is not a given structure of kinship
relations that causally determines the structure of a group and the interactions among its
members, but via the ritual activities this structure emerges.
Yet the ritual imposes a certain formal structure on a group, especially via the gen-
ealogies. This is the dimension of zong in Chinese kinship. But zong is a highly flexible
and open category, as varying genealogical depth would theoretically allow to perform
groups of any scope and reach in the present, as is visible in Huang practices. Therefore,
qin matters. The performative role of qin springs to the eye, as this is predetermined
neither by zong nor by biological relatedness. As many authors, such as recently Trémon
(2014, 2015a) have argued, what binds a local kin group together are certain claims and
manifestations of a shared moral economy which is rooted in certain feelings of clo-
seness. Indeed, the Huang villagers at Xiasha have expressed their concerns about
violations of this moral economy by their leaders. Hence, qin represents the dimension
of conviviality, which is not congruent with ritual descent.
This is where the kinship notion ties up with the more general notion of guanxi,
certainly one of the best researched indigenous notions in studying the economy–society
interface in China (for surveys, see Bian 2018; Chen et al., 2013). This controversial
concept remains firmly established in Chinese studies, reflecting similar troubles in
catching the specificity of the Chinese case as with reference to kinship. Guanxi stay
orthogonal to Western concepts of social relations, because they appear to be “weak ties”
mediated in a symbolic frame that evokes “strong ties” in terms of moral obligations of
reciprocity (a Chinese perspective on this is Zhai, 2013). In this sense, the global Huang
networking is a guanxi phenomenon, in the strict sense. Establishing a global community
of Huang suggests the possibility to be “close” (invoked by the term qin) even though
the actual relationship is just “weak ties,” in a deflationary (“Western”) view. Performing
kinship rituals with varying reach and scope is a means to create the emotional effer-
vescence that imbues weak network relations with a stronger emotional bondage that
fosters reciprocity and cooperation (for a general sociological perspective on this role of
ritual, see Collins, 2005). In addition, as discussed in the second section, we need to take
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the additional level of associational forms into consideration: the Huang surname
association explicitly bridges between kinship ritual and more generic associational
practices, which create platforms and audiences for the formation of guanxi.
This view would apparently imply that in the end kinship ritual is arbitrary, as it is just
a symbolic medium of networking. But that does not do justice to the peculiar ways how
the kinship medium operates across various contexts. The two concepts of kinship and
guanxi have also been combined systematically by Kuah-Pearce (2011) in her study of
Singapore lineages activating their relationship with native villages in Mainland China.
She introduced the notion of a “cultural network”: Chinese kinship is focused on cultural
descent, which is embodied in the corresponding rituals and a wide range of artefacts and
practices, with “culture” being conceived as a form of life rooted in the imagination of
the “native place.” In the Huang case, cultural descent is not only embodied in standard
items such as ancestral halls but also more mundane practices and objects. We men-
tioned the “common pot” feasts; another example is the Huang wine, which is sold to
Huang at a steep discount, and with a bottle designed by a Huang, and similar items.
At this crucial point, it is necessary to notice that the concept of kinship has
undergone radical revisions in a recent anthropological research (with landmark con-
tributions such as Schneider, 1984 or Carsten, 2004). This view decidedly rejects any
reference to “biological” criteria to define and diagnose kinship in specific societies and
communities and approaches kinship as a cultural construct (for an overview, see Sah-
lins, 2013). However, this does not mean that kinship becomes arbitrary, as the cultural
construct, in a specific context, creates a special form of relationship between individuals
as “interrelated selves” and specific forms of collective identities. Indeed, this is what
Huang villagers at Xiasha see in the “common pot” feast: It expresses that the “you is in
the I, and the I is in the you” (a common saying: 你中有我、我中有你, ni zhong you
wo, wo zhong you ni), reflecting the intimate closeness and group spirit of the lineage
(族群宗亲理念, zuqun zongqin linian) (Sina, 2016).
One way to avoid the reduction of kinship to arbitrary symbolic constructivism is
Sangren’s (2013) concept of the Chinese family as “instituted fantasy”: As an instituted
fantasy, the reproduction of kinship roots in the desires of individual actors which are
instigated by the cultural context, but also drive their agency in reproducing that context.
That means, once the kinship relation is successfully performed, it loses its arbitrary
nature in becoming an essential aspect of individual identities embedded in webs of
interrelated selves which are demarcated by kinship terms and rituals.
Based on these conceptual clarifications, we can clearly discriminate between guanxi
as mere social networking and kinship relations as mediated by rituals. This leads us
back to the conceptual distinctions introduced by Zheng Zhenman (2001). If we refer
these to the Huang case, one litmus test of distinguishing between kinship and guanxi is
the form of the “contractual lineage”: as in the case of guanxi, the contractual lineage
builds on mutual benefit and shared interests in pursuing certain goals, mostly in an
economic context. We have observed business concerns pursued by Huang that can be
interpreted as modern transformations of this form: many companies are connected via
mutual investments of Huang, with one Huang taking the lead as a CEO respectively,
and others join as investors, sometimes also arranged into holdings and business groups.
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This happens when surname relations are not simply mobilised in general guanxi terms,
but also invoke the explicit activation of kinship ritual. In this case, shared cultural
descent implies a relationship between individuals that goes beyond mere shared eco-
nomic interests. Indeed, even the internet-based commercial activities of Huang tend to
exploit modern forms of business that emphasise sharing and non-profit motivation, as
we have seen. In our view, it is the kinship ritual that transforms mere guanxi into
structures that corresponds to Zheng’s type of a “contractual lineage.”
Further, the Huang at Xiasha manifest many features of a “control-subordination
lineage,” with its strong territorial identity and the role of internal stratification in
coordinating collective activities. In this regard, we also notice that another feature of
traditional lineages survives today, as analysed in much detail by Zheng: this is the close
interaction between formal institutions of government and processes of structuration of
kinship. For example, in Imperial China registration for military service and lijia
institutions were often conditioning certain lineage practices, such as inheriting lijia
obligations, while also protecting the local community against intrusions of the state.
The hybrid governance structure of the shareholding cooperative manifest a similar
mutual conditioning of lineage dynamics and government.
In conclusion, in answering our original question what exactly is the “tradition” that
appears to revive in contemporary kinship rituals, we highlight the highly adaptive nature
of kinship ritual as a performative practice that mediates between closer kin defined by
conviviality and expanding circles of “closeness” that are symbolically mediated by
cultural descent as defined by zong. This is the view on traditional kinship that emerges
from recent historical scholarship and which is highly productive in interpreting the
current practices of the Huang. The most important divergence between the tradition and
the contemporary conditions is the role of ideology and active promotion of patriarchal
norms by the state: hence, an important question for future research is how far the current
revival of Confucianism in China in wider society (Billioud and Thoraval, 2015) and the
endorsement of values such as “filial piety” (孝, xiao) by the Chinese government might
reconstitute the role of kinship in governing Chinese society that was shaping Imperial
China, as part of an emerging pattern of cultural governance. After a long neglect of
research on kinship in contemporary Chinese studies, we need a revival of this field.
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